de Chantal, P.-L., Newman, I., Thompson, V., Markovits, H.   A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability […]

Dual process theories postulate the existence of two levels of processing, Type 1, which uses belief-based cues to make very rapid inferences, and Type 2, which uses more conscious, working memory-based processes that are, in principle, capable of making rule-based judgments. There is a common assumption that Type 1 processes are more rapidly produced, while […]

Studies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms (If the ball is blue, then the shape is square). However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to […]

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests […]

The dual strategy model of reasoning proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d’Ydewalle (Thinking & Reasoning, 11(3), 239–278, 2005a; Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107–119, 2005b) suggests that people can use either a statistical or a counterexample-based strategy to make deductive inferences. Subsequent studies have supported this distinction and investigated some properties of the two strategies. In the following, we examine the […]